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I.-11 
CONGRESS HAS ALREADY RULED IN 
CALIFORNIA v. TEXAS 
JOHN ALOYSIUS COGAN JR.* 
Abstract: In California v. Texas, opponents of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) 
have asked the Supreme Court to invalidate the statute. Relying on a 2017 legis-
lative change to the ACA’s individual mandate, the challengers argue that the 
mandate is unconstitutional. They then assert that the mandate is inseverable 
from the rest of the ACA, thus the entire statute must fall. Earlier this year, how-
ever, Congress said otherwise. Last March, Congress passed the Families First 
Coronavirus Response Act and the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Secu-
rity Act. The two statutes amend and expand provisions of the ACA, thereby 
overriding Texas v. United States, the district court decision that underlies Cali-
fornia v. Texas. In short, Congress has already ruled, via an override, on the sev-
erability question at issue in California v. Texas. The ACA stands, even with an 
unconstitutional individual mandate. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, when access to health insurance 
is a financial and medical necessity for nearly every American, California v. 
Texas raises a critical question: is the Affordable Care Act1 (ACA) still good 
law?2 The parties challenging the ACA have asked the Supreme Court to inval-
idate the entire statute. Their argument has two parts. First, they claim a 2017 
statute, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act3 (TCJA), rendered the ACA’s individual 
mandate—the requirement that most Americans buy standardized health insur-
ance policies or pay a penalty4—unconstitutional.5 They quickly pivot to their 
second, more consequential claim: the individual mandate cannot be severed 
from the rest of the ACA.6 Thus, the entire ACA must be struck down. 
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 1 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
 2 Texas v. United States, 945 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. granted sub nom. California v. Tex-
as, 140 S. Ct. 1262 (2020). 
 3 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA), Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017) (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
 4 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (providing that certain individuals “shall . . . ensure” they are “covered 
under minimum essential coverage”). 
 5 Opening Brief for the Petitioners at 2, California v. Texas, 140 S. Ct. 1262 (No. 19-840). 
 6 Id. 
I.-12 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:E. Supp. 
Despite their many differences, the parties in California v. Texas agree on 
one thing—the severability analysis, which is the central issue in the case, 
turns on congressional intent.7 The two sides, however, offer contradictory ev-
idence of that intent. The challengers point to the text of the ACA from 2010 
and argue that Congress intended the mandate to be inseverable from the rest 
of the statute.8 The defenders contend that Congress’s intent to preserve the 
ACA was manifest in 2017 when the TCJA affected only one part of the ACA 
but left the rest of the statute standing.9 In this Essay, I argue that the parties’ 
focus on congressional intent from 2010 and 2017 is misplaced. The Court 
should instead look at what Congress did in 2020. 
In March of 2020, Congress passed the Families First Coronavirus Re-
sponse Act (FFCRA)10 and the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Securi-
ty Act (CARES) Act.11 Twenty separate provisions of the FFCRA and the 
CARES Act incorporate, apply, or extend parts of the ACA.12 Critically, Con-
gress passed these statutes knowing the individual mandate had already been 
ruled unconstitutional by two federal courts.13 As a result, the FFCRA and the 
CARES Act have a direct and consequential effect on California v. Texas. The 
FFCRA and the CARES Act not only offer up-to-the-minute evidence of Con-
gress’s intent regarding the viability of the ACA, they do something much 
more substantial. The two statutes override the severability ruling in Texas v. 
United States, the district court decision that underlies California v. Texas.14 
To restate this point in the plainest possible terms, Congress has already 
ruled—through an override—on the severability question at issue in California 
v. Texas. When it passed the FFCRA and the CARES Act, Congress made 
clear, as a matter of law, that the ACA stands, even without the individual 
mandate. 
This Essay proceeds in three parts. Part I provides necessary background 
on Texas v. United States.15 Part II briefly describes congressional overrides.16 
                                                                                                                           
 7 See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 685 (1987) (“The more relevant inquiry in 
evaluating severability is whether the statute will function in a manner consistent with the intent of 
Congress.”). 
 8 Brief for Respondent/Cross-Petitioner States at I, 7, 14, California v. Texas, 140 S. Ct. 1262 
(No. 19-840). 
 9 Opening Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 5, at 36–39. 
 10 Families First Coronavirus Response Act (FFCRA), Pub. L. No. 116-127, 134 Stat. 178 (2020). 
 11 Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 
281 (2020). 
 12 See infra Appendix A (listing seven provisions of the FFCRA that incorporate, apply, or extend 
parts of the ACA); Appendix B (listing thirteen provisions of the CARES Act that incorporate, apply, 
or extend parts of the ACA). 
 13 See infra notes 28–38 and accompanying text. 
 14 See Texas v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 3d 579, 619 (N.D. Tex. 2018), aff’d in part, vacated 
in part, 945 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. granted sub nom. California v. Texas, 140 S. Ct. 1262 
(2020). 
 15 See infra notes 18–40 and accompanying text. 
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Part III explains how Congress overrode the severability ruling in Texas v. 
United States.17 
I. TEXAS V. UNITED STATES 
The origins of Texas v. United States date back to National Federation of 
Independent Business (NFIB) v. Sebelius, when the Supreme Court first con-
sidered the constitutionality of the individual mandate.18 Although the Court 
ruled that Congress lacked authority to impose the mandate under the Constitu-
tion’s Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses,19 the Court nevertheless 
upheld the individual mandate.20 Writing for the split majority, Chief Justice 
John Roberts reasoned that the individual mandate’s penalty could be viewed 
as an exercise of Congress’s taxing power because it “looks like a tax in many 
respects”21 and would provide “some revenue” for the government.22 
Nearly five years later, in December of 2017, Congress revisited the man-
date penalty. After failing to repeal the ACA at least seventy times,23 Congress 
enacted the TCJA, which reduced the mandate penalty to $0, but left the man-
date—and the rest of the ACA—in place.24 After the TCJA was passed, Presi-
dent Trump claimed in the State of the Union address that “the individual 
mandate is now gone.”25 Shortly thereafter, more than a dozen Republican-led 
states and several individuals filed suit in federal district court challenging the 
ACA.26 
The plaintiffs in Texas v. United States offered a two-step argument to 
strike down the ACA. First, they claimed the ACA’s individual mandate is un-
constitutional. Once the TCJA reduced the mandate penalty to $0, the penalty 
no longer “looks like a tax” because it generates no revenue. Thus, NFIB’s 
                                                                                                                           
 16 See infra notes 41–51 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 52–91 and accompanying text. 
 18 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. (NFIB) v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 530 (2012). 
 19 Id. at 561. 
 20 Id. at 588. 
 21 Id. at 563. 
 22 Id. at 564. 
 23 See Chris Riotta, GOP Aims to Kill Obamacare Yet Again After Failing 70 Times, NEWSWEEK 
(July 29, 2017), https://www.newsweek.com/gop-health-care-bill-repeal-and-replace-70-failed-attempts-
643832 [https://perma.cc/QAK9-L5MT] (noting at least seventy attempts by Republicans to repeal or 
undermine the ACA between 2010 and 2017). 
 24 TCJA, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11081(b), 131 Stat. 2054, 2092 (2017) (codified at 26 U.S.C. 
§ 5000A(c)(3)). 
 25 See Dan Mangan, Trump Touts Repeal of Key Part in ‘Disastrous Obamacare’—the Individual 
Mandate, CNBC (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/30/trump-touts-repeal-of-obamacare-
individual-mandate.html [https://perma.cc/NJ7G-8DCQ]. 
 26 See Katie Keith, DOJ, Republican AGs Ask Supreme Court to Strike Down ACA, HEALTH 
AFFAIRS BLOG (June 26, 2020), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200626.180922/
full/ [https://perma.cc/X48U-GZEP]. 
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holding—that the mandate is authorized by Congress’s taxing power—no 
longer applies.27 
The plaintiffs’ second, more consequential claim was that the mandate 
cannot be severed from the rest of the ACA. Their argument is based largely on 
a provision of the ACA they call the “inseverability clause.”28 To be clear, the 
ACA contains no express inseverability clause. The plaintiffs, however, argued 
that 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(I) functions as an inseverability clause because it 
states that the mandate is “essential” to the functioning of the ACA.29 The U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ) agreed that the mandate was unconstitutional,30 
but argued that the individual mandate was not severable from two other provi-
sions of the ACA, the guaranteed-issue and community-rating requirements.31 
Instead, DOJ argued the three provisions were severable from the rest of the 
ACA.32 
The district court sided with the plaintiffs. After ruling the mandate un-
constitutional, the court determined that the mandate was inseverable from the 
ACA.33 The text of § 18091, the court concluded, was “the best evidence of 
congressional intent.”34 The court continued, “Virtually every subsection of 42 
U.S.C. § 18091 is teeming with Congress’s intent that the Individual Mandate 
be inseverable—because it is essential—from the entire ACA—because it 
must work together with the other provisions.”35 The court went on, “In sum, 
the Individual Mandate ‘is so interwoven with [the ACA’s] regulations that 
they cannot be separated. None of them can stand.’”36 
                                                                                                                           
 27 Brief of Plaintiffs in Support of Application for Preliminary Injunction at 23–26, Texas v. 
United States, 340 F. Supp. 3d 579 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (No. 4:18-cv-00167-O). 
 28 Id. at 33. 
 29 Id. at 30–35; see 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(I). The plaintiffs in Texas v. United States were not the 
first to refer to § 18091(2)(I) as an inseverability clause. In NFIB, the Solicitor General argued that the 
mandate was inseverable from the guaranteed-issue and community-rating provisions and proposed 
that § 18091(2)(I) “effectively serves as an inseverability clause.” Brief for Respondents (Severabil-
ity) at 26, NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (Nos. 11-393, 11-400); Reply Brief for the Re-
spondents (Severability) at 10, NFIB, 567 U.S. 519 (Nos. 11-393,11-400). 
 30 Federal Defendants’ Memorandum in Response to Plaintiffs’ Application for Preliminary In-
junction at 9, Texas v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 3d 579 (No. 4:18-cv-00167-O) [hereinafter Federal 
Defendants’ Memorandum] (“The United States agrees with Plaintiffs that the ACA’s individual 
mandate, as amended by the TCJA, is unconstitutional.”). 
 31 Id. at 13–15. The guaranteed-issue requirement prohibits insurers from denying coverage based 
on an applicant’s health status and requires insurers to offer insurance to any eligible individual or 
group applying for coverage. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-1, 300gg-3, 300gg-4(a). The community-rating 
requirement bars insurers from using health status and most other factors to vary their rates. Insurers 
can only use family size, geographic area, age, and tobacco use. Id. §§ 300gg(a)(1), 300gg-4(b). These 
are part of the ACA’s protections for people with preexisting medical conditions. 
 32 Federal Defendants’ Memorandum, supra note 30, at 16–19. 
 33 Texas v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 3d at 610. 
 34 Id. at 609–10 (quoting Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 392 n.4 (2013)). 
 35 Id. at 610. 
 36 Id. at 615 (quoting Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 70 (1922)). 
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed the man-
date was unconstitutional but remanded the matter for further analysis of the 
severability question.37 The case did not go back to the district court. Instead, it 
went to the Supreme Court.38 
As a practical matter, there is no mandate; it has been a toothless require-
ment since Congress eliminated its penalty in 2017. And, as it turns out, recent 
coverage data suggests the ACA operates just fine without the mandate.39 In 
Texas v. United States, however, the mandate did serve an important purpose—
it was the launchpad for the challengers’ inseverability argument. Last March, 
however, Congress passed the FFCRA and the CARES Act, which shredded 
the challengers’ argument by overriding the severability ruling in Texas v. 
United States.40 
II. CONGRESSIONAL OVERRIDES 
A congressional override is “the legislative equivalent of a judicial over-
ruling.”41 As a constitutional matter, Congress enjoys supremacy over statutory 
matters. Section 1 of Article I of the Constitution vests Congress with “All leg-
islative Powers.”42 As Chief Justice Roberts has recognized, Congress—not 
the judiciary—has the final say on how a statute should be interpreted and ap-
plied.43 Thus, when a court says that a statute means X, Congress has the pow-
er to say, “No, it does not.”44 To be clear, an override is not a reversal of a par-
ticular court decision. Instead, an override is a superseding instruction to the 
judiciary about how a statute should be applied. 
Congressional overrides of judicial decisions may seem unusual, perhaps 
unique. Not so. Congress has enacted legislation to override, reverse, or modi-
                                                                                                                           
 37 Texas v. United States, 945 F.3d 355, 393 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. granted sub nom. California v. 
Texas, 140 S. Ct. 1262 (2020). During the appeal, DOJ changed its position and argued that the entire 
ACA was inseverable from the mandate. Id. at 374. 
 38 See California v. Texas, No. 19-840 (S. Ct. argued Nov. 10, 2020). 
 39 See Sarah Kliff, Republicans Killed the Obamacare Mandate. New Data Shows It Didn’t Really 
Matter., N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/18/upshot/obamacare-mandate-republicans.
html [https://perma.cc/5PJZ-P6S9] (Sept. 21, 2020). 
 40 See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text. 
 41 Brian J. Broughman & Deborah A. Widiss, After the Override: An Empirical Analysis of Shad-
ow Precedent, 46 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 52 (2017). 
 42 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of 
the United States . . . .”). 
 43 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the 
United States: Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 231 (2005). C.J. Roberts noted 
during his confirmation hearing, “The final say on a statute is with Congress, and if they don’t like the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of it, they can change it . . . .” Id. 
 44 See Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers: Statutory Interpre-
tation of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 511, 513 (2009) (citing Johnson v. 
Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 630 n.7 (1987) (quoting GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR 
THE AGE OF STATUTES 31–32 (1982))). 
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fy hundreds of judicial interpretations of statutes and regulations since the late 
1960s.45 It is not uncommon, as in Texas v. United States, for Congress to over-
ride lower court decisions.46 
Unfortunately, two things complicate the application of the FFCRA and 
the CARES Act override in California v. Texas. The first is timing. Congress 
passed the FFCRA and the CARES Act after the Supreme Court granted certi-
orari in California v. Texas but before the first briefs were due.47 The parties 
were left with little time to analyze how the FFCRA and the CARES Act might 
affect the severability question. Thus, it is not surprising that the parties did not 
brief the issue. 
The second complication is the visibility—or perhaps the invisibility—of 
overrides. Empirical studies note that overrides are hard to identify.48 Some-
times Congress explicitly identifies a statute as an override.49 Often, though, 
there is no express language in a statute or its committee reports (if any exist) 
that identifies a statute as an override. Thus, many overrides are implicit.50 
Congress says nothing about the override even as it issues one. This is the case 
with the FFCRA and the CARES Act override. Congress provided no affirma-
tive, ex ante statement that the FFCRA and the CARES Act override the sever-
ability ruling in Texas v. United States.51 Thus, detailed statutory analysis is 
                                                                                                                           
 45 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 
101 YALE L.J. 331, 338 tbl.1 (1991) (noting that between 1967 and 1990, Congress passed 187 over-
ride statutes, overriding 344 federal court statutory interpretations). 
 46 See id. at 338 (“Congress frequently overrides or modifies statutory decisions by lower federal 
courts as well as those by the Supreme Court.”). 
 47 The opening briefs in California v. Texas were due on May 6, 2020. See Docket Entry, Califor-
nia v. Texas, No. 19-840 (S. Ct. Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docketfiles/
html/public/19-840.html [https://perma.cc/W9CU-62FJ]. The FFCRA became law on March 18, 
2020. Pub. L. No. 116-127, 134 Stat. 178 (2020). The CARES Act became law on March 27, 2020. 
Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020). 
 48 See, e.g., Deborah A. Widiss, Identifying Congressional Overrides Should Not Be This Hard, 
92 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 145, 147 (2014), http://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/
Widiss-92-SeeAlso1.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7CF-KRBE] (noting that researchers “agree that it is very 
difficult to identify overrides”). 
 49 See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 45, at 418–19 (identifying overrides by searching for references 
to Supreme Court statutory interpretation decisions in Congressional committee reports); Richard L. 
Hasen, End of the Dialogue? Political Polarization, the Supreme Court, and Congress, 86 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 205, 217, 259–60 (2013) (applying the same method of identifying overrides). 
 50 See Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of Supreme 
Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1328–29 (2014) (identi-
fying overrides using an expanded method that included Westlaw data and other sources). 
 51 Implicit overrides are just as much the law as explicit overrides. Moreover, even if an override 
is “unconscious,” that is, the override statute was not “consciously” aimed at superseding a court deci-
sion, it is still law and must be followed. See Matthew R. Christiansen, William N. Eskridge Jr. & 
Sam N. Thypin-Bermeo, The Conscious Congress: How Not to Define Overrides, 93 TEX. L. REV. 
SEE ALSO 289, 297 (2015), https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/93-Tex.-L.-Rev.-
See-Also-289.pdf [https://perma.cc/4WLA-K43J] (“[W]hen it comes to congressional overrides . . . 
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necessary to show how the FFCRA and the CARES Act override and super-
sede the severability ruling in Texas v. United States. Part III of this Essay pro-
vides that detailed statutory analysis. 
III. CONGRESS OVERRODE THE SEVERABILITY RULING  
IN TEXAS V. UNITED STATES 
Following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States, 
Congress passed three relief statutes in March of 2020.52 Two of those statutes, 
the FFCRA and the CARES Act, provide coverage for COVID-19 testing and 
preventive care (i.e., vaccinations) to millions of Americans.53 Congress relied 
on existing public and private health insurance systems and funding mecha-
nisms to expand this coverage and the ACA was a key mechanism to provide 
this expanded coverage.54 Section A of this Part describes how the FFCRA and 
the CARES Act incorporated, applied, and expanded provisions of the ACA in 
response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Next, Section B shows how the FFCRA 
and the CARES Act overrode the severability holding in Texas v. United States. 
Congress knew the mandate had been ruled unconstitutional in Texas v. United 
States and that the ruling had been upheld on appeal. Nevertheless, Congress 
passed the FFCRA and the CARES Act, thereby overriding Texas v. United 
States. 
A. The Override Provisions 
Congress’s use of the ACA to expand coverage in response to the 
COVID-19 pandemic was no mistake or oversight; it was quite deliberate. The 
FFCRA and the CARES Act cite the ACA by name or citation more than a 
half-dozen times.55 The two statutes use ACA-defined terms, such as “mini-
mum essential coverage”56 and “grandfathered” health plan.57 The FFCRA 
even incorporates the ACA’s individual and group health insurance market re-
forms provisions, which include the guaranteed-issue and community-rating 
                                                                                                                           
[agencies, courts, and private actors] must obey the override, unless it is a scrivener’s error or an un-
constitutional directive.”). 
 52 The first COVID-19 response law was the Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supple-
mental Appropriations Act, 2020. Pub. L. No. 116-123, 134 Stat. 146 (2020). 
 53 See generally CARES Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020); FFCRA, Pub. L. No. 
116-127, 134 Stat. 178 (2020) (expanding COVID-19 coverage through Medicare, Medicare Ad-
vantage, Medicaid, the State Children’s Health Insurance Program, TRICARE, the Veterans Admin-
istration, the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program, the Indian Health Service, and private 
health insurance). 
 54 See infra notes 60–85 and accompanying text. 
 55 CARES Act §§ 3211(a), 3803(a)(1), 3812(a), 3812(b), 3831(a), 3831(b); FFCRA § 6001(a). 
 56 CARES Act § 3716. 
 57 FFCRA § 6001(a). 
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requirements.58 But the FFCRA and the CARES Act connect to the ACA even 
more deeply. Twenty separate provisions of the two statutes incorporate, apply, 
and extend parts of the ACA to provide health benefits through a variety of 
public programs and insurance markets, including individual and group private 
health insurance, Medicaid, Medicare, the Indian Health Service, and through 
federal health centers.59 
1. Private Health Insurance 
The FFCRA expands ACA private health insurance coverage by requiring 
all private health insurers and group health plans offering ACA insurance to 
cover COVID-19 testing, the costs of test administration, and related items and 
services, without cost sharing (no deductibles, coinsurance, or copays) through 
the duration of the emergency.60 This requirement applies only to ACA health 
insurance.61 The CARES Act establishes a method for determining the amount 
ACA health insurers and group plans must pay health care providers for 
COVID-19 testing required by the FFCRA.62 
Moreover, because these coverage benefits are tied to the ACA, and be-
cause ACA benefits and protections are integrated, these ACA benefits auto-
matically trigger all of the ACA’s patient protections, including the protections 
for preexisting conditions.63 No one who tests positive for COVID-19 under 
these coverage provisions can be denied coverage or charged a higher premi-
um in ACA health plans.64 
The CARES Act also expands ACA private health insurance coverage by 
requiring all private health insurers and group health plans offering ACA in-
surance to cover the cost of COVID-19 vaccination and other potential 
COVID-19 preventive services.65 Like the testing requirement of the FFCRA, 
this applies only to ACA health insurance.66 
                                                                                                                           
 58 FFCRA § 6001(b) states that provisions of section 6001(a) “shall be applied . . . to group health 
plans and health insurance issuers offering group or individual health insurance coverage as if includ-
ed in the provisions of part A of title XXVII of the Public Health Service Act.” The ACA amended 
Part A of title XXVII of the Public Health Service Act to include the guaranteed-issue and communi-
ty-rating requirements. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg, 300gg-1, 300gg-3, 300gg-4; see also supra note 31 
and accompanying text. 
 59 See infra Appendices A–B (listing provisions of the FFCRA and the CARES Act that incorpo-
rate, apply, and extend the ACA). 
 60 FFCRA § 6001(a) (as amended by CARES Act § 3201). 
 61 Individuals with a non-ACA health insurance are considered “uninsured” for the purposes of 
the FFCRA and may be eligible for coverage under other provisions of the FFCRA. Id. § 6004 (defin-
ing uninsured). 
 62 CARES Act § 3202. 
 63 See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 64 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg, 300gg-1, 300gg-3, 300gg-4. 
 65 CARES Act § 3203. 
 66 Id. 
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2. Medicaid 
The FFCRA increases Medicaid benefits, including benefits for individu-
als with ACA-expanded Medicaid coverage. These benefits include COVID-19 
testing, the costs of test administration, and related items and services, without 
cost sharing, during the public health emergency.67 
The FFCRA also creates a new Medicaid coverage category for the unin-
sured. States have the option to extend Medicaid eligibility to uninsured indi-
viduals for purposes of COVID-19 diagnostic testing and testing-related ser-
vices during the emergency period.68 The FFCRA incorporates the definition 
of ACA insurance coverage into its definition of an “uninsured individual.” For 
the purposes of the FFCRA, an individual not enrolled in ACA individual or 
group coverage or enrolled in a federal health plan is considered “uninsured.”69 
Thus, anyone with non-ACA private health insurance is deemed “uninsured” 
and eligible for this new category of Medicaid coverage. In other words, Con-
gress recognized only one kind of health insurance under the FFCRA—ACA 
health insurance.70 
The FFCRA also provides increased Medicaid funding to all states and 
territories, but under the condition that states and territories cannot remove 
Medicaid enrollees from coverage, including enrollees in ACA-expanded Med-
icaid, during the public health crisis.71 
3. Medicare 
Among the various Medicare-related provisions in the FFCRA and the 
CARES Act, the CARES Act amends the Medicare hospital inpatient payment 
formula, which was extensively reworked by the ACA. Medicare increased 
hospital payments for patients diagnosed with COVID-19.72 
4. Indian Health Service 
The FFCRA also includes,73 and provides payment for,74 COVID-19 test-
ing and items and services associated with such testing, without any cost-
sharing requirements through the Indian Health Service (IHS). The IHS pro-
                                                                                                                           
 67 FFCRA § 6004(a)(1)–(2) (as amended by CARES Act § 3717). 
 68 Id. § 6004(a)(3)(A)–(C). 
 69 Id. § 6004(a)(3)(C). 
 70 In addition to using Medicaid as a vehicle to provide COVID-19 testing to uninsured individu-
als, Title V of the FFCRA provides funding to the National Disaster Medical System that can be used 
to reimburse health care providers for costs related to COVID-19 testing for uninsured individuals. 
See id. Div. A, tit. V. 
 71 Id. § 6008 (as amended by CARES Act § 3716). 
 72 CARES Act § 3710(a) (increasing diagnosis-related group payment by twenty percent). 
 73 FFCRA § 6007. 
 74 Id. Div. A, tit. IV. 
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vides health care to American Indians and Alaska Natives directly or through 
programs or facilities operated by Indian tribes or tribal organizations. The IHS 
also provides services to urban Indians through grants to or contracts with Ur-
ban Indian Organizations (UIOs). The testing provisions of the FFCRA apply 
to any Indian, as defined by the Indian Health Care Improvement Act (IHCIA), 
receiving services through the IHS, including through UIOs, during the emer-
gency period.75 Thus, the FFCRA incorporates and applies a provision of the 
ACA that permanently reauthorized the IHCIA76 and gave IHS authority to 
grant funding to UIOs.77 
5. Federal Health Centers 
The federal Health Center Program, which was permanently authorized 
by the ACA, provides funding to federal health centers that provide medical 
care to low-income individuals.78 The CARES Act supplements ACA funding 
of the Health Center program by appropriating $1.32 billion for federal health 
centers for the detection of the COVID-19 virus, or prevention, diagnosis, and 
treatment of COVID-19 illnesses.79 In addition, the CARES Act adds more 
than $2 billion to the Community Health Center Fund (CHCF).80 The CHCF 
was established by the ACA and funds community health centers, a type of 
federal health center that serves individuals in the general population who have 
limited access to health care.81 
6. Other ACA Provisions 
The CARES Act also amends several non-health coverage sections of the 
ACA, including provisions related to the Public Health Service’s Ready Re-
serve Corps,82 health savings and flexible spending account spending,83 Medi-
caid spousal impoverishment protections,84 and funding assistance for low-
income health programs.85 
                                                                                                                           
 75 Id. § 6007. 
 76 ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10221(a), 124 Stat. 119, 935 (2010) (codified at 25 U.S.C. 
§§ 1601–1680v). 
 77 See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1603(29), 1652. 
 78 ACA § 5601(a) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 254b). 
 79 CARES Act § 3211. 
 80 Id. § 3831. 
 81 See ELAYNE J. HEISLER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43937, FEDERAL HEALTH CENTERS: AN OVER-
VIEW 13 (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43937.pdf [https://perma.cc/RGM8-MHFF]. 
 82 CARES Act § 3214. 
 83 Id. § 3702. 
 84 Id. § 3812. 
 85 Id. § 3803. 
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B. Congress Knew the Mandate Was Unconstitutional 
Typically, there is a presumption that Congress is “aware of relevant judi-
cial precedent” when it enacts a new statute.86 If we were to assume, consistent 
with this presumption, that Congress was aware of all relevant caselaw when it 
applied and extended the ACA via the FFCRA and the CARES Act, we would 
assume the following. First, Congress was aware that NFIB v. Sebelius upheld 
the mandate penalty as an exercise of Congress’s taxing power. Thus, when 
Congress reduced the mandate penalty to $0, it was aware that mandate’s con-
stitutional support evaporated. Second, we would also assume that Congress 
was aware that two federal courts had already ruled the mandate unconstitu-
tional prior to March 2020, when it passed the FFCRA and the CARES Act. 
Given these assumptions, the FFCRA and the CARES Act must be seen as an 
implicit override of the severability ruling in Texas v. United States. Congress 
knew the mandate was unconstitutional. Nevertheless, it applied and extended 
the ACA via the FFCRA and the CARES Act. 
There is, however, no need to rely on presumptions to draw this conclu-
sion. Congress had actual knowledge of the unconstitutionality of the mandate 
when it passed the FFCRA and the CARES Act. The Attorney General notified 
Congress in June of 2018 that DOJ viewed the individual mandate as unconsti-
tutional and would not defend it in court.87 Moreover, Congress documented 
its knowledge of the district court’s ruling in Texas v. United States. Just weeks 
after the court issued its decision, the United States House of Representatives 
voted by resolution to intervene in the case.88 The House then intervened and 
joined the appeal of the Texas v. United States decision.89 Following the Fifth 
Circuit’s decision that ruled the mandate unconstitutional, the House then 
joined California v. Texas as a respondent supporting the state petitioners.90 All 
of this happened before Congress applied and extended the ACA by passing 
the FFCRA and the CARES Act.91 
                                                                                                                           
 86 Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 648 (2010). 
 87 Letter from Jefferson B. Sessions, Att’y Gen., to Paul Ryan, Speaker, House of Representatives 
(June 7, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/file/1069806/download [https://perma.cc/H43U-FAFC]. The 
Attorney General is required to notify Congress when DOJ will not defend the constitutionality of a 
federal statute in court. 28 U.S.C. § 530D(a)(1)(B)(ii). 
 88 H.R. Res. 6, 116th Cong. § 103(n) (2019), https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/hres6/BILLS-
116hres6eh.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8LJ-WUNX]. 
 89 Texas v. United States, 945 F.3d 355, 373–74 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. granted sub nom. Califor-
nia v. Texas, 140 S. Ct. 1262 (2020). 
 90 See Blanket Consent Filed by Respondent, U.S. House of Representatives, California v. Texas, 
No. 19-840 (S. Ct. Jan. 10, 2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/19-840/128206/2020
0110133802899_19-840%20-%20cert%20blanket%20consent.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HHG-NYNR] 
(noting that the U.S. House of Representatives is a respondent supporting the petitioner and consents 
to the filing of all amicus briefs). 
 91 The House of Representatives’ defense of the mandate before the Court of Appeals and the 
Supreme Court does not affect this analysis. Although the House may disagree with the district and 
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CONCLUSION 
In March of 2020, Congress reshuffled the ACA deck of cards and dealt 
the Supreme Court a new hand—a hand the Court must play. When it passed 
the FFCRA and the CARES Act, Congress confirmed that the ACA stands, 
despite the loss of the individual mandate. Congress made this clear by incor-
porating, applying, and extending the ACA in twenty separate provisions of the 
FFCRA and the CARES Act. Rather than tussling over a “nebulous inquir[y] 
into hypothetical congressional intent”92 from 2010 or 2017, the Court should 
apply Congress’s override of the severability ruling in Texas v. United States. 
The FFCRA and the CARES Act provide the Court with a direct, superseding 
instruction on the issue of severability: the ACA stands despite an unconstitu-
tional mandate. 
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circuit court decisions, that disagreement does not alter the fact that Congress passed the FFCRA and 
the CARES Act with knowledge that the mandate had twice been ruled unconstitutional and could 
again be ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. 
 92 Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2220 (2020) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 320 n.7 
(2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting in part)). 
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APPENDIX A 
FFCRA INCORPORATIONS, APPLICATIONS, AND EXTENSIONS OF THE ACA 
FFCRA Section Explanation 
Section(s) of the ACA  
Implicated 
Div. A, tit. IV 
Second Corona-
virus Preparedness 
and Response Sup-
plemental Appro-
priations Act, 2020. 
134 Stat. 181 
Appropriates $64 million to 
the IHS until September 30, 
2022 to provide COVID-19 
items and services, as de-
scribed in FFCRA § 6007, 
to Indians, as defined in the 
IHCIA, receiving health 
services through the IHS, 
including through UIOs. 
ACA § 10221(a), which 
permanently reauthorized 
and updated the IHCIA 
(codified at 25 U.S.C.  
§§ 1601–1680v). As part of 
its ACA updates, the IH-
CIA authorizes IHS to 
grant funding to UIOs. See 
25 U.S.C. §§ 1603(29), 
1652.  
Div. A, tit. V 
Second Corona-
virus Preparedness 
and Response Sup-
plemental Appro-
priations Act, 2020. 
134 Stat. 182 
Appropriates $1 billion to 
pay claims of health care 
providers for COVID-19 
testing as described in 
FFCRA § 6001(a), provided 
to “uninsured individuals” 
during the emergency peri-
od. An “uninsured individu-
al” is an individual not en-
rolled in (1) a federal health 
care program or (2) a group 
health plan or individual 
and group health insurance 
coverage as defined in 
§ 2791 of the Public Health 
Service Act (PHSA) (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-
91). The ACA patient pro-
tection and market reforms 
apply to group health plans 
and individual and group 
health insurance coverage 
as defined in PHSA § 2791. 
Thus, individuals without 
ACA-compliant private 
health insurance would be 
ACA § 1001, which 
amended the PHSA to in-
clude individual and group 
health insurance reforms 
for individual and group 
health insurance coverage 
and group health plans 
defined in PHSA § 2791. 
 
ACA § 1551, which ap-
plies the definitions in 
PHSA § 2791 to the ACA. 
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deemed “uninsured” even if 
that person has some other 
form of coverage. 
§ 6001(a), (b), (d) 
Coverage of Test-
ing for COVID-19. 
134 Stat. 201–02 
Expands benefits offered by 
ACA group health plans and 
health insurers offering 
ACA group or individual 
health insurance coverage 
(including ACA grandfa-
thered health plans) to in-
clude COVID-19 testing 
and related items and ser-
vices without cost sharing 
during the emergency peri-
od. The section incorporated 
the definitions of “group 
health plan,” “health insur-
ance issue,” “group health 
insurance coverage,” and 
“individual health insurance 
coverage” in PHSA § 2791, 
the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 
1974, and § 9832 of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 
1986. These definitions 
define ACA plans and cov-
erage. 
ACA § 1001, which 
amended the PHSA to in-
clude individual and group 
health insurance reforms 
for individual and group 
health insurance coverage 
and group health plans 
defined in PHSA § 2791. 
 
ACA § 1251(e), which 
defines grandfathered 
health plans). 
 
ACA § 1551, which ap-
plies definitions in PHSA 
§ 2791 to the ACA. 
 
FFCRA § 6001(b) requires 
§ 6001(a) to be applied as 
if included in part A of title 
XXVII of the PHSA, 
which includes the ACA’s 
individual and group mar-
ket reforms, including, but 
not limited to, the ACA’s 
community rating and 
guaranteed issue require-
ments (codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 300gg, 300gg-1, 
300gg-3, 300gg-4). 
 
ACA § 1201, which 
amended the PHSA to in-
clude health insurance 
market reforms for indi-
vidual and group health 
insurance and group health 
plan coverage defined in 
PHSA § 2791. 
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§ 6004(a)(1), (2) 
Coverage at No 
Cost Sharing of  
COVID-19 Testing 
Under Medicaid 
and CHIP. 
134 Stat. 204-05 
Expands Medicaid benefits 
to include coverage for 
COVID-19 testing and re-
lated items and services 
without cost sharing during 
the emergency period. 
These expanded benefits 
apply to Medicaid coverage 
expanded under ACA. See 
42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(xiv). 
ACA § 2001, which ex-
pands Medicaid coverage 
to low-income individuals. 
See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VII). 
§ 6004(a)(3)(A)–
(C) 
Coverage at No 
Cost Sharing of 
COVID-19 Testing 
Under Medicaid 
and CHIP. 
134 Stat. 205–06 
Gives states the option to 
extend Medicaid eligibility 
to “uninsured individuals” 
for purposes of providing 
COVID-19 testing and re-
lated items and services 
during the emergency peri-
od. An “uninsured individu-
al” for the purpose of this 
section is a person not eligi-
ble for ACA’s Medicaid 
expansion (in expansion 
states) and not enrolled in a 
federal health care program, 
a federal employee plan, or 
a group health plan or indi-
vidual and group health 
insurance coverage as de-
fined in § 2791 of the 
PHSA. Like FFCRA Div. A, 
tit. V, the § 6004 definition 
of “uninsured” incorporates 
the definition of ACA group 
plans and individual and 
group health insurance cov-
erage. It also incorporates 
the definition of ACA Med-
icaid expansion coverage. 
Individuals without ACA-
compliant private health 
insurance would be deemed 
“uninsured” even if that 
ACA § 1001, which 
amended the PHSA to in-
clude individual and group 
health insurance reforms 
for individual and group 
health insurance coverage 
and group health plans 
defined in PHSA § 2791. 
 
ACA § 1551, which ap-
plies definitions in PHSA 
§ 2791 to the ACA. 
 
ACA § 2001, which ex-
pands Medicaid coverage 
to low-income individuals. 
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person has some other form 
of coverage and would 
therefore be eligible for this 
extended Medicaid cover-
age. 
§ 6007 
Coverage of Test-
ing for COVID-19 
at No Cost Sharing 
for Indians Receiv-
ing Pur-
chased/Referred 
Care. 
134 Stat. 208 
Expands coverage for Indi-
ans, as defined in IHCIA 
§ 4, receiving health ser-
vices through the IHS, in-
cluding through a UIO, to 
include COVID-19 testing 
and related items and ser-
vices or the administration 
of such products during the 
emergency period. 
ACA § 10221(a), which 
permanently reauthorized 
and updated the IHCIA 
(codified at 25 U.S.C.  
§§ 1601–1680v). As part of 
its ACA updates, the IH-
CIA authorizes IHS to 
grant funding to UIOs. See 
25 U.S.C. §§ 1603(29), 
1652. 
§ 6008 
Temporary Increase 
of Medicaid FMAP. 
134 Stat. 208–09 
Provides states with tempo-
rary increase in federal 
Medicaid funding during 
the emergency period. 
States accepting this fund-
ing many not impose new 
Medicaid eligibility re-
strictions or take away Med-
icaid coverage during the 
public health emergency. 
The bar on eligibility re-
strictions and Medicaid 
terminations applies ACA-
expanded Medicaid cover-
age. 
ACA § 2001, which ex-
pands Medicaid coverage 
to low-income individuals. 
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APPENDIX B 
CARES ACT INCORPORATIONS, APPLICATIONS, AND EXTENSIONS OF THE ACA 
CARES Act  
Section Explanation 
Section(s) of ACA  
Implicated 
§ 3201 
Coverage of Diagnos-
tic Testing For 
COVID-19. 
134 Stat. 366–67 
Amends the definition of a 
COVID-19 diagnostic test 
enacted in FFCRA 
§ 6001(a) to include a 
broader range of covered 
diagnostic items and ser-
vices. FFCRA § 6001(a) 
expands benefits offered by 
ACA group health plans and 
health insurers offering 
ACA group or individual 
health insurance coverage 
(including ACA grandfa-
thered health plans) to in-
clude COVID-19 testing 
and related items and ser-
vices without cost sharing 
during the emergency peri-
od. 
Sections of the ACA 
implicated by FFCRA 
§ 6001(a), including: 
ACA § 1001, which 
amended the PHSA to 
include individual and 
group health insurance 
reforms for individual 
and group health insur-
ance coverage and group 
health plans defined in 
PHSA § 2791. 
 
ACA § 1251(e), which 
defines grandfathered 
health plans. 
 
ACA § 1551, which ap-
plies definitions in 
PHSA § 2791 to the 
ACA. 
 
FFCRA § 6001(b) re-
quires § 6001(a) to be 
applied as if included in 
part A of title XXVII of 
the PHSA, which in-
cludes the ACA’s indi-
vidual and group market 
reforms, including, but 
not limited to, the ACA’s 
community-rating and 
guaranteed-issue re-
quirements (codified at 
42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg, 
300gg-1, 300gg-3, 
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300gg-4). 
 
ACA § 1201, which 
amended the PHSA to 
include health insurance 
market reforms for indi-
vidual and group health 
insurance and group 
health plan coverage 
defined in PHSA § 2791. 
§ 3202 
Pricing of Diagnostic 
Testing. 
134 Stat. 367 
Requires ACA group health 
plans and health insurers 
offering ACA group or indi-
vidual health insurance cov-
erage (including ACA 
grandfathered health plans) 
that are providing coverage 
of COVID-19 diagnostic 
testing and related items and 
services pursuant to FFRCA 
§ 6001(a) to reimburse 
health care providers at ei-
ther the negotiated rate or, if 
the plan or issuer does not 
have a negotiated rate with 
the provider, the listed cash 
price for that service. 
Sections of the ACA 
implicated by FFCRA 
§ 6001(a), including 
ACA § 1001, which 
amended the PHSA to 
include individual and 
group health insurance 
reforms for individual 
and group health insur-
ance coverage and group 
health plans defined in 
PHSA § 2791. 
 
ACA § 1251(e), which 
defines grandfathered 
health plans. ACA 
§ 1551, which applies 
definitions in PHSA 
§ 2791 to the ACA. 
§ 3203 
Rapid Coverage of 
Preventive Services 
and Vaccines for 
Coronavirus. 
134 Stat. 367–68 
Expands benefits offered by 
ACA group health plans and 
health insurers offering 
ACA group or individual 
health insurance coverage 
by requiring group health 
plans and health insurance 
issuers offering group or 
individual health insurance 
to cover, without cost-
sharing, any qualifying 
coronavirus preventive ser-
ACA § 1001, which 
amends the PHSA to 
include individual and 
group health insurance 
reforms for individual 
and group health insur-
ance coverage and group 
health plans defined in 
PHSA § 2791. 
 
 ACA § 1001, which 
amends the PHSA to 
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vice, pursuant to section 
PHSA § 2713(a) (codified at 
42 U.S.C. 300gg–13(a)). 
The terms “group health 
plan,” “health insurance 
issuer,” “group health insur-
ance coverage,” and “indi-
vidual health insurance cov-
erage” have the meanings 
given in PHSA § 2791. 
require group health 
plans and providers of 
individual and group 
health insurance to cover 
recommended preventive 
services and screenings 
and immunizations with-
out cost sharing.  
 
ACA § 1551, which ap-
plies definitions in 
PHSA § 2791 to the 
ACA. 
§ 3211 
Supplemental Awards 
for Health Centers. 
134 Stat. 368 
Supplements ACA funding 
of the Health Center Pro-
gram by appropriating $1.32 
billion to federal health cen-
ters for the detection of the 
COVID-19 virus, or preven-
tion, diagnosis, and treat-
ment of COVID-19. 
ACA § 5601(a), which 
permanently authorized 
the federal Health Center 
Program. 
§ 3214 
United States Public 
Health Service Mod-
ernization. 
134 Stat. 372–73 
Amends § 203 of the PHSA 
to allow the Ready Reserve 
Corps to be activated during 
a public health emergency. 
ACA § 5210, which 
amends § 203 of the 
PHSA (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 204), to estab-
lish a Ready Reserve 
Corps to have additional 
Commissioned Corps 
personnel available on 
short notice, similar to 
the uniformed services’ 
reserve program. 
§ 3702 
Inclusion of Certain 
Over-the-Counter 
Medical Products as 
Qualified Medical 
Expenses. 
134 Stat. 416 
Amends Internal Revenue 
Code § 233(d)(2) to allow 
patients to use funds in 
Health Savings Accounts 
(HSAs) and Flexible Spend-
ing Accounts (FSAs) for the 
purchase of menstrual care 
products and over-the-
counter medical products 
ACA § 9003, which pre-
viously permitted the use 
of funds from HSAs and 
FSAs only to pay for 
prescribed medicines or 
drugs. 
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without a prescription from 
a physician. See 26 U.S.C. 
§ 223(d)(2). 
§ 3710 
Medicare Hospital 
Inpatient Prospective 
Payment System Add-
On Payment for 
COVID–19 Patients 
During Emergency 
Period. 
134 Stat. 422 
Amends the Medicare inpa-
tient payment formula to 
increase payments by in-
creasing the weighting fac-
tor that applies to the diag-
nosis-related group (DRG) 
for patients diagnosed with 
COVID–19 by twenty per-
cent. 
Medicare’s inpatient 
hospital payment statute 
was extensively amend-
ed by the ACA, includ-
ing provisions related to 
adjustments to Medicare 
DRG payments, includ-
ing ACA §§ 3001, 3025. 
§ 3716 
Clarification Regard-
ing Uninsured Indi-
viduals. 
134 Stat. 425 
Clarifies that “uninsured” 
individuals under FFCRA 
§ 6004, which allows states 
to expand Medicaid cover-
age to “uninsured” individ-
uals, includes individuals in 
a state that did not expand 
Medicaid under the ACA 
and individuals who are 
enrolled in a government 
program, but whose benefits 
under such a program do not 
meet the ACA definition of 
“minimum essential cover-
age.” 
ACA § 1501(b), which 
sets out the definition of 
“minimum essential cov-
erage” (codified at 26 
U.S.C. § 5000A(f)).  
 
ACA § 2001, which ex-
pands Medicaid cover-
age to low-income indi-
viduals. 
§ 3803 
Extension of Funding 
Outreach and Assis-
tance for Low-Income 
Programs. 
134 Stat. 428–29 
Amends the Medicare Im-
provements for Patients and 
Providers Act of 2008 
§ 119(a)(1)(B), as amended 
by ACA § 3306, to extend 
funding for outreach and 
assistance for low-income 
programs. See Pub. L. No. 
110-275, § 119(a)(1)(B), 
122 Stat. 2492, 2508 (2008) 
(codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 1395b-3). 
ACA § 3306, which 
amends the Medicare 
Improvements for Pa-
tients and Providers Act 
of 2008 § 119(a)(1)(B). 
§ 3812 
Extension of Spousal 
Amends ACA § 2404 to 
extend the Medicaid spousal 
ACA § 2404, which pro-
vided Medicaid spousal 
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Impoverishment Pro-
tections. 
134 Stat. 429 
impoverishment protections 
program through November 
30, 2020. Spousal impover-
ishment protections prevent 
married couples from be-
coming poverty-stricken in 
order for one of the spouses 
to qualify for long-term care 
under Medicaid. 
impoverishment protec-
tions for a limited time 
period. 
§ 3813 
Delay of DSH Reduc-
tions. 
134 Stat. 429–30 
Amends Social Security Act 
§ 1923(f)(7)(A) (codified at 
42 U.S.C. 1396r–4(f)(7)(A)) 
to delay scheduled reduc-
tions in Medicaid dispropor-
tionate share hospital (DSH) 
payments through Novem-
ber 30, 2020.  
ACA § 2551, which 
amends Social Security 
Act § 1923(f) to insert 
subsection (7), which 
reduces DSH payments 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. 
1396r–4(f)(7)). 
§ 3831 
Extension for Com-
munity Health Cen-
ters, the National 
Health Service Corps, 
and Teaching Health 
Centers That Operate 
GME Programs. 
134 Stat. 433–34 
Amends ACA 
§ 10503(b)(1)(F) to extend 
funding for the Community 
Health Center Fund 
(CHCF).  
ACA § 10503(b)(1)(F), 
which created and ap-
propriated funds to the 
CHCF (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 254b-
2(b)(1)(F)). 
Div. B, tit. VII 
Department of Health 
and Human Services 
Indian Health Service 
Indian Health Ser-
vices. 
134 Stat. 550–51 
Appropriates $1.032 billion, 
available until September 
30, 2021, to “prevent, pre-
pare for, and respond to 
coronavirus” for “Indian 
Health Services” provided 
that not less than $450 mil-
lion shall be distributed 
through IHS programs and 
to tribes and tribal organiza-
tions under the Indian Self-
Determination and Educa-
tion Assistance Act and 
through contracts or grants 
with UIOs under the IHCIA. 
ACA § 10221(a), which 
permanently reauthorized 
and updated the IHCIA 
(codified at 25 U.S.C.  
§§ 1601–1680v). As part 
of its ACA updates, the 
IHCIA authorizes IHS to 
grant funding to UIOs. 
See 25 U.S.C. 
§§ 1603(29), 1652. 
 
